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Abstract
Gillian G. Littleton: RUSSIA’S AGENDA FOR UKRAINE:
AN EXAMINATION OF PUTIN’S MEDIA PROPAGANDA NARRATIVES

This thesis explores Russian discourse about Ukraine as reflected in Russian popular media since 2014’s
Euromaidan Revolution. The thesis provides an overview of Russia’s historic denial of Ukrainian
statehood and it argues: Russian historians and politicians have seen Ukraine as a “little-brother” nation to
Russia, with a shared Slavic heritage, and that any attempts by Ukrainians to separate themselves from
Russia are Western influence movements. The thesis examines three types of mass media in order to
demonstrate the interaction between history, politics and popular culture. Chapter 1 explores the public
speeches of key Russian political figures including Vladimir Putin himself, alongside State Duma MP
Natalia Poklonskaya, and presidential adviser Sergei Glazyev. In Chapter 2, I analyze three popular
nonfiction books published since 2014 that pertain to the conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Finally
in Chapter 3 I discuss three war films about the relationship between Russia and Ukraine through their
visuals, effects and dramatizations.
Keywords: propaganda, unity, brotherhood, Euromaidan, Putin, identity, Russia, Ukraine
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Introduction
The 2014 Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, the ongoing military conflict
in Eastern Ukraine, and the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine present defining moments in the
region’s history. The conflict itself is complicated. Many mark the beginning of such increased
tension and violence with the 2013 Euromaidan protests which saw popular movements rise
against a pro-Kremlin government. These protests resulted in constitutional reforms, and changes
in governance after then President Yanukovych fled the country. These events exacerbated the
already tumultuous relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian political leaders blame
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his government for their aggressive behaviors toward
Ukraine, their military movements within Ukrainian borders, and their disregard for Ukrainian
sovereignty. Russian political leaders dismiss such claims, blaming Ukrainian leaders for the
poor relations and increased tensions between the two nations, as can be seen in President Putin’s
2021 article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” wherein he outlines his view
of the historic relationship between the two nations and peoples. In this article, which appeared
in major Russian newspapers and on kremlin.ru, the President argued that the Ukrainian people
and the Russian people have shared Slavic cultures, shared faiths and shared histories, and yet
this ideology at its core erases Ukraines independent identity. How does this idea of historic
unity and neo-imperialism appear in Russian media? Do popular media sources serve the
Russian political agenda as propaganda when discussing the historic connection between Russia
and Ukraine? How do we see the historic relationship between Ukraine and Russia, as well as
Ukraine’s ties to the West, used within Russian media sources to serve as propaganda in
justifying Russian intervention in Ukraine?
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This study examines the depiction of Ukrainians and Ukrainian history from a Russian
perspective. Russian popular media presents Ukrainian history as Russian history marred by
nationalism, and its people as “Slavic brothers” of the Russian people. That is to say, the people
of Ukraine are an extension of the Russian people. That the vast majority of Ukrainians speak
Russian, practice similar Orthodox traditions, can link parentage to the greater Russian context,
are children of the Russian sphere and more. Russian sources of media, politicians, authors, and
film directors argue that there exists a historic unity between Russia and Ukraine, and that
reaffirming this unity is the key to both Russian and Ukrainian survival and revival. Moreover,
media sources in Russia present the Ukrainian government and its military as an enemy figure to
the common people between the two territorial spaces, one backed and supported by a Western,
primarily American, agenda. From this perspective, the Ukrainian government is a violent,
fascist regime that breaks the historic bonds between the two spaces. Russian political
propaganda regarding Ukraine often raises the question, if Russia and Ukraine are so similar,
why does the nation of Ukraine exist? In order to understand the political tensions between
Ukraine and Russia it is essential to understand cultural space regarding the two as well. This
study examines ideas of Russian political elites, polemical non-fiction, and films related to
Ukraine and its history in order to explore the contemporary Russian understanding of its
relationship with Ukraine, focusing primarily on the period since the Euromaidan Revolution and
Russia’s invasion of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014.

Literature Review
This thesis speaks to two different trends within the scholarship on Russia: First, to the
issue of Russian national identity within the framework of its relationship with Ukraine; and
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second, it examines the role and nature of Russian political and cultural propaganda. There exists
a vast literature discussing the historic relationship between Russia and Ukraine, the struggles
with understanding Ukrainian identity both from a Ukrainian and Russian perspective, and more.
Mark von Hagens 1995 article “Does Ukraine Have a History?” provides an initial
starting point in understanding the issues between Ukrainian and Russian identities as they relate
to history. He notes that to major Western academic centers, “Ukrainian history as a field...does
not exist per say” (von Hagen 1995, 658). Ukrainian historians’ work to establish a historical
lineage through which to trace modern Ukraine is complicated by Russian historians' similar
historical claims. In this article he discusses thinking about this region of Eastern Europe in the
context of past empires, historical power dynamics, Soviet legacies, as well as issues relating to
the study of Ukrainian history. He writes that during the early 20th century, following the
Russian Revolution and establishment of the U.S.S.R., “Historians of the national question, as it
was then called, were encouraged to emphasize the friendly historical ties between Russians and
their ‘little brother peoples’” (von Hagen 1995, 663). In trying to establish a separate history of
Ukraine, Myhailo Hrushevs'ky, the “father” of Ukrainian history, traced the origins of Ukraine to
“Kievan Rus' and to the Cossack Hetmanate,'' two historic proto-state federations of peoples
located in modern Ukraine and parts of Russia (von Hagen 1995, 667).
Russian historians contested the premise that Ukraine arose as the sole successor to these
two historic proto-states. They insist on the “continuity of Kievan and Muscovite rule,” meaning
that Kyivan Rus’ morphed or was absorbed into the earliest forms of the Russian empire (von
Hagen 1995, 668). Essentially, Ukrainian historians cannot claim this as their origin source
because it is Russia’s own origin source. Von Hagen finds that Soviet era politicians and
scholars, as well as earlier Russian historians, shared a belief of a "socialist commonwealth" or
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earlier“vserossiiskaia imperiia” (or all Russian Empire) (von Hagen 1995, 660). In other words,
the Russian or Soviet intelligentsia believed that much of Eastern Europe as it is known today
fell under the Russian sphere of influence and governance. Von Hagen writes, “The assertions of
national sovereignties and historical legitimacy are inextricably bound to the question of the
Russian… traditional relations with the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe,” further asserting
the complexities in defining Ukrainian regional identity, and how that identity is tied to Russia
(von Hagen 1995, 661).
Von Hagens article, published in 1995, serves this topic as one of the first academic
works to explore the discourse within Russian academia and politics regarding the validity of
Ukrainian claims to state and historic legitimacy. His influential work served as the starting point
for this line of inquiry, and because of von Hagens work no one in the West would question the
historical existence of Ukraine despite Russians continuing to do so. These ideas laid out by von
Hagen are further expanded and enforced when reviewing author Mykola Riabchuk’s article
“Ukrainians as Russia’s Negative ‘Other’: History Comes Full Circle,” which outlines the
manner in which Russians see themselves as “brothers” of the Ukrainians. He highlights that
Russian nationalists, like Putin himself, draw “ideological inspiration from pre-Soviet and
Russian emigre writers who always denied Ukrainians were a separate people” (Riabchuk 2016,
75). This is an important point to consider for this thesis as it outlines a key theme within
Russian media propaganda that I try to identify; Russian nationalists, today as they did
throughout modern history, do not view Ukrainian people as separate in identity from that of
Russians. This idea permeates most modern Russian historiography. Riabchuk also identifies the
Soviet understanding of Ukrainians “to be the same people’ as Russians” existing within the
“tripartite formula of a ‘Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian brotherhood’” (Riabchuk 2016, 79).
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In the eyes of the Soviet leadership, Russia and Ukraine served as nations with the same
roots, with subtle differences in development and depth of modernization. To what do Soviet
scholars attribute this tripartite brotherhood? Historic Kyiv Rus’1, an early federation of slavic
and other Eastern European peoples from the late 9th century that lasted until the mid 13th
century. Within this trio, the author notes that an essential element to Russia’s understanding of
its identity in correlation with these two countries is that, “Russians were assigned the role of the
‘older brother’ within this triad, which underlined, quite crudely, their political dominance and
cultural superiority” (Riabchuk 2016, 79). Thus the primary understanding of Ukraine within
Soviet identity was that of the backwards “little brother”, still of the same blood, but needing
assistance. Earlier than this Soviet understanding, Riabchuk outlines Russian Imperial
understandings of the historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Riabchuk notes that in
reality there was little Russian interest in its Kyiv Rus’ legacy “until it was ‘rediscovered’ at the
turn of the 17th century”, with scholars under the Tsar “inventing tradition” to fit within an
imperial narrative. The linking of Kyiv Rus’ (and Ukrainians) to Russian history aided the Tsar
in creating “the official version of the ‘thousand-year-old Russian history’’ (Riabchuk 2016, 77).
Interestingly, the Tsarist usage of Kyiv Rus’ to extend Russia’s legitimacy can be viewed as a
form of imperial propaganda.
The Russian notion that the old Kyiv Rus’ serves to justify the historic ties between
Russians and Ukrainians, and the use of such identity as propaganda, is well studied. Taras Kuzio
in his 2016 article, “Soviet and Russian anti-(Ukrainian) Nationalism and re-Stalinization”
further discusses this idea. He writes that for most of the 20th century, “Kyiv Rus’ was portrayed
as the birthplace of the ‘fraternal’ Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples…by incorporating
the Russian Imperial succession theory of Kyiv Rus’ to Vladimir-Suzdal, Muscovy, Imperial
1

This is typically called “Kievan Rus” or “Kievskaia Rus’” in Russian
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Russia and the U.S.S.R.” (Kuzio 2016A, 90). Essentially, by claiming Kyiv Rus’ as the
birthplace of Russian people as well as Ukrainians, Ukraine is therefore stripped of having a
seperate history or unique place of origin. This Russian way of identifying the past creates a
sense that Ukrainians as part of the Russian world is integral in understanding Russian history,
thus without this unified history, what is Russia’s history?
In another work, titled “Russian National Identity and the Russia-Ukraine Crisis,” Kuzio
outlines four key theories that serve as approaches to understanding Russian national identity:
Union identity, the Russian nation incorporating all three eastern Slavic peoples; the Russian
nation as a community of Russian speakers; the Russian nation defined radically; and a civic
Russian national identity grounded in the Russian Federation (Kuzio 2016B, 3). Of particular
interest is the theory of the Russian nation incorporating all three eastern Slavic peoples. Here
the author outlines the belief of President Putin and other political figures in “odin narod” (one
people), the idea that Russians and Ukrainians are the same people living in the same cultural
space (Kuzio 2016B, 3). Kuzio is outlining that one key understanding of Russian identity as a
nation is its existence as a country with shared lineage, and shared people, with the modern day
successors of the early slavic proto-nations like that of Kyiv Rus’. The Russian understanding of
Ukrainians, as part of the Russian world, is integral to Russian identity. Therefore, what happens
when Ukrainians attempt to sever ties with Russia both through modern day politics and their
own historical and national understandings?
Within the Russian identity as the “older brother”, Ukrainians exist in two different
spheres. There are the “good” Ukrainians, described by Kuzio as, “Those loyal to the hierarchy
of Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet nationalities' policies [and] accept Russia as the ‘elder
brother’” (Kuzio 2016A, 87). The Ukrainians Russia likes, favors, are those who acknowledge if
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not agree that Russia is critically important to Ukraine. Thus the “bad” Ukrainians are those who
oppose this presentation of Russo-Ukrainian identity that sees Russian in a place of superiority
over Ukraine. Kuzio writes, “those who disagree with the hierarchy who have been defined as
‘agents of Austria,’ ‘bourgeois nationalists’ and ‘fascists’” (Kuzio 2016A, 87). This raises an
important point that must be outlined for further usage within this thesis, the meaning of “fascist”
as it relates to the Russian-Ukrainian discourse because it has nothing to do with the Western
understandings of fascism. He writes (Kuzio 1995),
‘Fascism’ was a misused and abused term in the Soviet Union and continues to be in
contemporary Russia. In both cases it has incorporated all shades of political opinions,
ranging from national communists through to liberal democrats and nationalists in
Ukraine; who oppose the Soviet Stalinist-Brezhnevite and Russian designation of
Ukrainians as a branch of the Russian nation with Russians being the ‘elder brothers’; do
not support Ukraine's place within the Russian World and instead back Ukraine's
integration into Europe, ( 88).
Any Ukrainian deviation from Russian identity theories linking the two nations together, as well
as deviation from the notion of Russia as the “kin” or “older brother” of Ukraine, is grounds for
fascism. Ukrainians who do not support Russia’s worldview and desire for a neo-imperial
revitalization of what Russians believe to be their shared history are “betrayers” and enemies of
not only Russsians as we understand them, but the Russian world. The question then becomes, if
Russian identity is tied to a notion of kinship and shared origin with Ukraine, and “fascist”
Ukrainians are trying to separate themselves from this historic unity, how does Russia employ
propaganda tactics to salvage their national identity?
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Here it is important to understand the modern functionings of the Russian propaganda
machine. The Russian government must argue such points in a convincing manner so that against
the backdrop of regional nationalism Russian influence can still propagate. To do so the Russian
government must employ a powerful propaganda machine, and it does. Authors Christopher Paul
and Miriam Matthews discuss the changing Russian propaganda environment in their 2016
article titled “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model: Why it might work and
options to counter it”. They outline four key elements to modern Russian propaganda. 1. It is
high-volume and multichannel 2. It is rapid, continuous, and repetitive 3. It lacks commitment to
objective reality 4. It lacks commitment to consistency (Paul and Matthews 2016, 2). The article
describes these elements in relation to mainstream news and social media, but these theories can
be applied to the sources examined in this thesis; political speeches, literary works, and films.
The two elements that resonate with this thesis’ research are 2 and 3. In arguing Russian
propaganda is high volume, the authors mean it is pervasive. Russian propaganda messages flow
through every element of the media and are unavoidable. Russian propaganda is repetitive, the
messages espoused by different channels, people, directors or actors aim to say the same thing,
even if in different contexts or words. It is repetitive, too, in that it monitors events and responds
to related events in equal fashion. An example of this could be seen in comparing the message in
Putin’s 2021 speech “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” and his 2022 speech
discussing Russian moves into Ukraine. Russian propaganda, if not wholly based in fiction, fuses
falsehood and reality in a manner that makes it easily disseminated and digestible.
If Russian propaganda has the ability to disseminate large swaths of disinformation, to
stay current, to remain ubiquitous in its messages, just what are those messages? This is where
the above issues of identity and history come into play. In an article titled “History as a

RUSSIA’S AGENDA FOR UKRAINE
14
Propaganda Tool In Putin’s Russia,” author Miguel Liñán outlines the way history is used within
the Russian propaganda sphere. This article, written in 2010, examines the manner in which
Putin and the Russian government employed history as a form of propaganda within the first few
years of Putin’s presidency. Liñán writes, “Right from the start, Vladimir Putin…included
restoring his countrymen’s pride in being Russian among his propagandistic aims,” (Liñán 2010,
168). Following the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the Russian identities described above became
somewhat confused, and lost, and historical identities were employed by Putin to consolidate
power and influence, and he did so by using Russian media to promote identity politics. Liñán
describes one of the main objectives of Russian governmental propaganda is, “to build social
consensus on the only correct version of Russian history; a version cobbled together by
politicians and political scientists with an academic veneer applied by historians sharing the
vision of those in power” (Liñán 2010, 168). The Russian version of history sees itself as a
long-withstanding state, founded from Kyiv Rus’, tied historically to Ukrainian people, and the
protector of such people from “fascist” ideologists. Liñán’s examination of history as a
propaganda tool used by Russia to secure political power gives insight into the initial Russian
goals in weaponizing the historic identity discourse. He writes, “The other main objective of this
campaign is to endow the figure of Putin...with historical mission” (Liñán 2010, 171). The works
outlined in this literature review discuss Russian understandings of Ukrainian history and
legitimacy, and provide an overview of the manner in which this discourse continuously arises in
historical and political contexts. That said, if these ideas over time became interwoven in Russian
political and academic circles, it must too seep into other elements of Russian society. The
purpose of this thesis is to expand this discourse. My research focuses on how these multifaceted
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Russian ideas regarding the invalidity of the Ukrainian state bleed from the political and
academic spheres into Russian domestic popular culture.

Methodology
My thesis is a qualitative study of Russian mass media discourse about Ukraine and
Ukrainian history since the Euromaidan and the war in the Donbas. This study aims to
investigate the manner in which Ukrainian history and national identity is presented to the
broader Russian public by media sources in order to understand how the relationship between
Russia and Ukraine factors into Russia’s propaganda landscape. In this qualitative study, the
works and clues within the works act as data. This thesis relies on textual and audio-visual
analysis.
Three main genres of broadly consumed media production were selected for this study,
all three with different voices and audiences to better understand the reach of the narrative. The
research considers the words and works of politicians, popular non-fiction, and mainstream
cinema. What is sought in the analysis of these three distinct primary source types is evidence of
pro-government attitudes pertaining to Ukraine, allegiances within Ukrainian people to Russia.
Within these three genres of popular media, three individual sources were selected, chosen for
their relation to relevant issues, such as the Euromaidan protests, the Annexation of Crimea, and
the conflict in the Donbass. This evidence will be diction, framing, word choice, imagery, and
“fact” presentation. This thesis aims at finding evidence of an anti-Ukrainian discourse within
popular media.

RUSSIA’S AGENDA FOR UKRAINE
16
Chapter Outline:
Chapter 1 focuses on the speeches and works of key Russian political figures. How do
these figures discuss and present the historical relationship between Russia and Ukraine? The
first chapter discusses the manner in which key Russian political figures paint the historic
relationship between Russia and Ukraine. The goal is to analyze their diction and the factual
accuracy of their points, assessing the extent to which they promote or enforce the idea that
Ukraine is an essential part of the Russian identity, and this identity is being systematically
destroyed by the Ukrainian government and American interests. These sources consist of pieces
written by politicians and dispersed by state media, interviews, and social media posts on official
channels. President Vladimir Putin is one figure of study, and special attention is paid to “On the
Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, his article that outlines Putin’s perspective and
goals for Ukraine within his Russia. This thesis also examines Russian politician Sergey
Glazyev, who served as an advisor to Putin from 2012 to 2019, and held several high positions in
the Russian government. Glazyev played a critical role in the 2014 Annexation of Crimea,
financing pro-Russian and anti-Maidan rallies, and became a key figure in 2016’s subsequent
international media frenzy due to secret recordings of him exposing his involvement in the
seperatist movements in Southeastern Ukraine. Finally I look at State Duma member Natalia
Poklonskaia. Poklonskaia is a Ukrainian-born prosecutor who defected to the Russian Federation
after the Annexation of Crimea in 2014 and thereafter became the Prosecutor General of Crimea.
She is an avid supporter of Putin, and has become a cultural icon.
Chapter 2 investigates the presentation of Ukrainian history and national identity through
the eyes of Russian authors in popular non-fiction works, specifically “history” works. I examine
Ukraine: Chaos and Revolution - The Dollar’s Weapon by Nikolay Starikov, Igor Strelkov: The
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Horror of the Facist Junta. Defense of Donbass by Mikhail Polikarpov, and Ukraine: Eternal
Ruin by Lev Vershinin. Starikov’s book is included in this research because of its focus on
Western influence within Ukraine in connection with the Euromaidan protests, and the way in
which the author frames the relationship between the modern Ukrainian government and Western
governments. Polikarpov’s book is included in this thesis because it takes a direct look at the
current conflict in Donbas and provides a purely Russian-positive outlook on the goals and issues
relating to the upheaval that plagues the region. Finally, Vershinin’s book is included because
rather than focus on the modern day conflicts between Russia and Ukraine it provides a popular
Russian interpretation of Ukraine’s history of statehood. These books function as propaganda
under a different name, making them intriguing primary sources to study, as their voices are
presented to the public as fact not fiction, unbiased though littered with propaganda.
Finally, Chapter 3 follows with an analysis of the portrayal of Ukrainian history and
nationalism in key films by Russian and Russian-affiliated directors, investigating Ukraine and
Ukrainian history through the lens of recent Russian cinema. The films examined in this study
are Sunburn (2021) by Maxim Brius, Rebel Girl (2019) by Aleksei Kozlov, and We are From the
Future II (2010) by Andres Puutstumsa. Sunburn (2021) is an important film to consider due to
its focus on the unabashed violence of the Ukrainian army toward the people of Donbas, which
presents convincing, shock-value propaganda tactics. Rebel Girl (2019), too, contains similar
elements of shock-violence to purport its message, and contains themes of love and religion
through which an audience can relate. More interestingly, this film is shot in the Donbas itself,
produced by a seperatist film studio. Finally, 2010’s We are From the Future II (2010) contains
early examples of the perspectives of Ukrainian fascisim and tied history, employing overt
stereotypes that are expanded upon in later films. Though this film falls outside of the thesis’
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main period of study, it provides an early example of Russian filmmakers stereotyping and
vilification of Ukrainians. These films create a fictional experience for viewers however they
base these stories in a fusion of fact and propaganda, presenting a biased image to viewers and
enforcing themes of unity to argue their agenda.
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Chapter 1
Political Elites and the Messages They Distribute:
Propaganda Goals From the Top Down
For this chapter, the writings, interviews, and speeches of critical Russian political figures
are examined. These political figures serve as political spokespersons for the official Russian
perspective of Ukraine, based on historical myths explored both in the literature review and
subsequent chapters. The first figure to be examined in this chapter is President Vladimir Putin,
who while elected, arguably holds an autocratic position in governance and sets forth the Russian
media and policy agendas. Following the study on Putin, State Duma member Natalia
Poklonskaia is discussed. Poklonskaia presents an interesting figure of study as she is a
Ukrainian born prosecutor for Crimea, and upon the Annexation of Crimea she was both
confirmed by Russia as the Prosecutor General of Crimea and declared a war criminal by
Ukraine. She is an avid supporter of Putin, and she herself became a cultural icon. Finally, this
chapter examines Russian politician Sergey Glazyev. Glazyev served as an advisor to President
Putin from 2012 to 2019, held several high positions in the Russian government, and played a
critical role in the 2014 Annexation of Crimea. I analyze their diction and factual accuracy of
their points in order to show the extent to which they promote or enforce the idea that Ukraine is
an essential part of the Russian identity, and this identity is being systematically destroyed by the
Ukrainian government and American interests.

Setting the Tone: Putin’s Message of Unity
To best understand the propaganda narratives painted in Russian mass media regarding
the historic relationship between Russia and Ukraine one must first examine the sources of all
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propaganda agendas, Vladimir Putin. As the head of the Russian state, he is the voice looked to
first and foremost by everyday citizens, as well as the controller of what is and is not subjected to
censorship under Russia’s propaganda machine. On June 12, 2021, Putin wrote an article titled,
“On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” on his official presidential website. Rather
than just serve as a one-off posting on the Kremlin website, this article served Putin as an op-ed,
the article is widely cited and was reviewed or discussed in practically every main-stream news
source, both domestically in Russia and internationally. The extensive article presents historic
anecdotes and Putin’s interpretation of the relationship between the two nations, and becomes the
key source in understanding the manner in which Ukraine is presented to Russian audiences.
He argues that Ukrainians and Russians are one people, part of the same whole. He
writes, “Russians and Ukrainians are one nation, one whole...I have spoken of this before, this is
my conviction” (Putin, 2021). In this quote, Putin uses the Russian word “edinoe” meaning
unified. Throughout the article, he uses a variation of this root word “unity” 32 times. Putin
stresses the importance of a unified Russian people, and claims to want to tear down boundaries
between the two peoples. This serves as an extension of the “brotherhood” ideology. In another
example, Putin discusses the 1686 Treaty of Eternal Peace between the Tsardom of Russia and
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in which Kyiv and the lands to the left of the Dnieper
river fell under the Tsardom’s domain. Rather than say this region was absorbed by the Tsardom,
Putin specifically states that the “inhabitants were reunited with the main part of the Russian
Orthodox people” (Putin, 2021). In using “reunited,” Putin establishes that the people living in
this region were one with the historic Russian people, and were now welcomed home to the
Tsardom after a long period of separation. This event occurred in 1686, many centuries before
the Annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Eastern Ukraine, however here Putin is using
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this historical event as a justification for such actions. Above all else, Putin wants to convince his
readers, Russian people and Russian speakers, that they and the Ukrainian people are one.

Figure 1.1 “President Putin”

Putin also argues in this article that borders are relative, and that they separate the
historically familial Russian and Ukrainian people arbitrarily. Putin’s description of borders and
their use in his article are key to understanding what Putin is trying to accomplish. In two key
instances in his article, Putin establishes that the borders between Russia and Ukraine are
essentially irrelevant. First, in discussing the Soviet period, he writes “...the borders between the
republics, of course, were not perceived as state borders, they were conditional in the framework
of a single country” (Putin, 2021). Here Putin establishes that the border system between the
republics in the U.S.S.R. operated more like state lines rather than international borders. What is
important is not the specific operation of these borders, but rather the way Putin frames them.
Following the breakup of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, he argues, “the people who lived there, suddenly
found themselves abroad,” and “they were torn away from their historic homeland” (Putin,
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2021). He further establishes the idea that Russians and Ukrainians are one by writing “historic
homeland”, and his use of “torn away” rather than separated creates a negative and emotive tone.
This is something tragic to Putin, and he wants readers to feel that tragedy. The tragedy itself he
placed upon the borders. The borders are the problem and reason for the separation of unified
Russian people.
Putin writes that, “modern Ukraine is entirely the brainchild of the Soviet era. We know
and remember that to a large extent it was created at the expense of historical Russia” (Putin
2021). He argues that modern Ukrainian territory and by extension the inhabitants of said
territory, historically were Russian, and had it not been for the land distribution tactics of Soviet
leadership, these lands would still be a part of Russia today. Interestingly, this furthers his earlier
point about the liquid borders within the U.S.S.R. Then it did not necessarily matter which
territories were part of Russia, Ukraine, or any Soviet republic, because they were all part of one
unified whole. He argues that when the breakup of the U.S.S.R. occurred, that is when this
distribution of territory became a problem, because the once liquid borders were now hard
borders separating the unified Russian-Ukrainian people. Putin’s opinion of this situation is made
clear, he writes that, “One thing is clear: Russia has actually been robbed” (Putin, 2021). This
sentiment is key for understanding the way Russian popular media assumes a victim status in this
situation, with Ukraine as the villian.
A final, essential, argument Putin establishes in this article that guides the media narrative
in Russia is his definition of the heroes and villains in the story of Russian-Ukrainian
brotherhood. This source is the most recent of all those in this thesis, published in mid-2021. It is
therefore understood that the subsequent sources analyzed in this thesis and the arguments they
make are consolidated in Putin's essay. To Putin, the heroes are those Ukrainians who still ally
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themselves with Russia and Russian culture, and the villains are those who separated the
Ukrainian and Russian people. One hero cited in this article is author Taras Shevchenko. Putin
discusses that through the fragmentation of historically Russian lands and peoples, “life in
different states, regional linguistic features and dialects have emerged,” and that the literary
works resulting from this are “our common literary and cultural heritage” (Putin, 2021).
Shevchenko is a hero in Putin’s argument because, despite writing his poetry in Ukrainian, his
prose is identified as written “mostly in Russian” (Putin, 2021). Figures like Shevchenko push
Putin’s assessment that Ukrainians can and should identify as Ukrainian, as he writes poetry in
his native language, however it is essential that they not denounce or push away their shared
Russian heritage as well, as his prose is written in Russian. A hero in the unity of Ukraine and
Russia is a figure that while adhering to their personal cultural group, still celebrates and
supports their greater Russia identity. In conjunction with Shevchenko Putin identifies other
literary figures of cultural importance that also bridge the gap between personal identity and
Russian identity like Ivan Kotlyarevsky, Grigory Skovoroda, and Nikolai Gogol.
But if figures like Shevchenko are who Putin highlights as the heroes in the story of
Ukrainian and Russian unity, who are the villains he identifies? The villains are those who push
to separate Ukrainians and Russians, no matter how that may look. An early villain Putin
establishes is the Soviet leadership who arbitrarily distributed the borders within the U.S.S.R.
Going back to the issue on borders, the manner in which Putin frames the drawing of borders
under Soviet leadership is very negative. He writes, “The Bolsheviks treated the Russian people
as inexhaustible material for social experiments,” and that, “Ultimately, what exactly guided the
leaders of the Bolsheviks, shredding the country, no longer matters” (Putin, 2021). Putin’s choice
of the words “inexhaustible,” and “shredding” create a disgusted tone, and places partial blame
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of the relationship between Ukrainian people and Russian people on their nation building
practices.
The modern villain Putin establishes in this text, that is essential to understanding the
mass media narrative being pushed about the international relations between Russia and Ukraine,
is that of the current Ukrainian government. Above all else, Putin places fault upon them.
Moreover Putin is attempting to erase Ukraine, both from a cultural perspective and governance
perspective. Speaking of “unity” 32 times in his article, and enforcing an idea of continuity
between the two states, Putin is arguing that the two states should come together as one.

The Role of The Glorious Defector: Natalia Poklonskaya
With an analysis of Putin’s stance regarding Ukraine and the messages he relays in the
media discussed above, the following sections discuss two key political figures that both reflect
and enforce his stance on the relationship between Russia and Ukraine. In this section we will
discuss Russian diplomat, former State Duma Member, and former Ukrainian prosecutor Natalia
Poklonskaya. Poklonskaya presents an interesting figure of study as she is a Ukrainian born
prosecutor for Crimea, and upon the Annexation of Crimea she was both confirmed by Russia as
the Prosecutor General of Crimea and declared a war criminal by Ukraine. She is an ardent
supporter of Putin, and she herself became a cultural icon. Her media presentation can be viewed
as a realization or a microcosm of Putin’s goals. Here is a Ukrainian born, Ukrainian speaking
woman who defected from her country of origin to Russia, and helped push forward Crimea’s
joining to Russia in 2014.
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Figure 1.2 “Poklonskaya Interviewed by Antonyms, 2021”
On March 17, 2021, Russian journalist Anton Krasovsky interviewed Poklonskaya for his
television show “Antonyms”, a popular and widely consumed television program in Russia. For
the purposes of this research the interview is located on Youtube with a video titled “Crimea. The
Seventh Anniversary of Reunification with Russia”. To begin, the interview’s title itself plays
into Putin's narrative of unity between Ukrainian and Russian peoples through the use of
“Reunification”. The description of the interview by Krasovsky provides a brief overview of
Poklonskaya’s political activity, her internet fame, and most notably her participation in the
Crimean referendum. What is interesting about this is that Krasovsky refers not to the
“annexation” of Crimea, or the Crimean “referendum”, but rather “krymskoi vesny” or the
“Crimean Spring” (Poklonskaya, 2021). This is in direct reference to the Arab Spring which saw
popular protests and uprisings throughout the Middle East, and equates the 2014 Crimean
Annexation to this movement. In doing so, it ignores the controversial elements of the
referendum that was by no means democratic or widely supported within Crimea, and it ignores
the violations of international laws of territorial integrity by the Russian Federation. By calling
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this situation a “Crimean Spring” in the videos description, it immediately erases Russian fault in
the situation, and in essence equates the Ukrainian government to the oppressive regimes that
controlled MENA nations in the onslaught of the Arab Spring. This adheres to Putin’s argument
that the Ukrainian government is the villain in the story between Ukraine and Russia.
The interview itself is just over an hour long, and the format of the show sees
Poklonskaya and Krasovsky sitting in a glass box, both dressed in black. At the beginning of the
interview, Poklonskaya discusses the Crimean referendum and subsequent Annexation.
Poklonskaya states, “ We [herself and Crimea] returned to the Russian Federation”
(Poklonskaya, 2021). She uses the Russian word “vernulis” or return. This is a natural thing, a
homecoming of sorts. This word, as opposed to stating “joined” signals a broader connection to
Russia, a kinship to Russia. As a Ukrainian, she, and by extension other Ukrainians in the region,
returned to their homeland through the Annexation.
Moreover Poklonskaya embodies the idea of “edinoe” or one people. Later in the
interview she discusses visiting a monastery while in Russia. She states she went to the
monastery in Yekaterinburg to show faith in the Russian Federation, and is quoted as saying she
“had never in [her] life been to Siberia” (Poklonskaya, 2021). This subtle accuracy highlights
Poklonskaya’s Ukrainian background. Yekaterinburg is located in the Ural Mountains, not in
Siberia, emphasizing that she herself was not raised Russian, and despite being a Russian
political figure, did not know elements of Russian geography. The interviewer pointed out this
inaccuracy, to which Poklonskaya responded interestingly. Rather than simply apologize for the
mistake and move forward, she laughs and blames the mistake on her Ukrainian heritage.
Poklonskaya responds, “I’m Ukrainian...Russian-speaking Ukrainian” (Paklonskaya, 2021). Here
she acknowledges her heritage, but identifies herself with Russia nonetheless. She views herself
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as both Russian and Ukrainian, and relays this to the interviewer and the audience. It reinforces
the idea that the people of Russia and Ukraine are in fact one nation, because here in this
interview sits a woman who still identifies as Ukrainian, yet defected her country for Russia and
above all else is Russian.
She is seen in the interview further identifying with Russia when discussing her political
career following her defection to Russia. Around the 21 minute mark, she describes the primary
Russian political party, Edinaia Rossia or “United Russia '', coming to her leading up to
elections. She describes how the party members told her that, according to sociological research,
the Russian people love her, support her, trust her and so forth, and thus the party asked
Poklonskaya to participate in elections affiliated with United Russia (Poklonskaya, 2021).
Poklonskaya was asked to run in elections affiliated with the most powerful and influential
political party in contemporary Russia. This alone signals her integration into Russia, and the
unity prescribed by Putin that should exist between Ukrainians and Russians. Furthermore, the
Russian people trust Poklonskaya, and in asking for her to run under these pretenses, she is
accepted in the eyes of the Russian people as Russian-enough to represent them in the political
sphere. This interview sends out a message that she is one with the Russian people and united to
the Russian people, because regardless of her Ukrainian heritage, she shares and actively
participates in a shared slavic identity with Russia. Her birthplace does not matter, because she is
Russian. For all intents and purposes, this creates an idea that Ukraine does not truly matter, what
matters is the unity between the peoples. This unity presupposes a Ukrainian national identity.
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Political Echos of Putin’s Narrative: Sergey Glazyev
Seregei Glazyev, like Poklonskaia, was born in the Ukraine, but holds a long and active
career in Russian politics. Most recently, Glazyev served as an advisor to Putin from 2012 to
2019. Glazyev came under an international microscope during the 2014 Annexation of Crimea,
and was one of the first Russian politicians to be sanctioned by President Obama in relation to
Crimea (LoGiurato, 2014). While Poklonskaya importantly highlights in her interviews the idea
of a unified Russian people, Glazyev enforces the other element of Putin’s argument, that the
Ukrainian government is in the pocket of the West and is the villain that is forcing the Ukrainian
people back to Russia.
On March 24, 2014, shortly after the Annexation of Crimea, Glazyev participated in an
interview with the editor-in-chief Dmitiri Simes of the right-wing American magazine The
National Interest, Dmitiri Simes, in which he spoke on the situation in Ukraine. Simes himself is
a Russian national, and is an avid supporter of the Russian government and personal friend of
Putin, and his work can be seen as an extension of the Russian propaganda arm abroad. Simes
asked Glazyev if he envisioned a scenario in which, “Russia would send its military into eastern
Ukraine?” (Simes, 2014). He tells Simes that the situation is inching toward a civil war, and in
such situations, “... regardless of whether the perpetrators wear a police or military uniform, it
will be not just Russia, but also the international community that would protect people,” (Simes,
2014). When speaking about the perpetrators of violence he directly identifies those people as
wearing police uniforms or military uniforms, both symbols of government institutions. One of
the three key narratives Putin pushes in his article is that the Ukrainian government is against its
people. That in essence is what Glazyev echos in specifically describing the police and military
personnel as violent figures against the Ukrainian people. In connection to this Glazyev identifies

RUSSIA’S AGENDA FOR UKRAINE
29
that Russia will when necessary “protect people” which creates a savior figure of the Russian
Federation. If the Ukrainian government continues to act out of violence to the Ukrainian people,
the Russian Federation will be ready to protect and save these people.

Figure 1.3 “Sergey Glazyev retrieved from the Moscow Times”

Putin wants Russian media to paint the Ukrainian government as for the West and not for
the people, villainizing the government and drawing Russian people's attention to their Ukrainian
brothers and sisters. In this same interview, Glazyev highlights the view that Ukrainian
politicians are fascists in cahoots with the United States. He states, “the entire crisis in Ukraine
was orchestrated, provoked, and financed by American institutions...They financed neo-Nazis”
(Simes, 2014). Glazyev, in accordance with Putin, enforces an image of the U.S. financially
backing a fascist regime in Ukraine. Glazyev expands this idea in stating (2014),
What we presently see in Ukraine is a symbiosis of neo-fascist groups on the one hand
and pro-Western ones on the other, working with the support of the United States, and
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simultaneously committing violence, pillages in the streets of Ukraine, and shootings of
peaceful protesters.

Glazyev’s quote is a critical example of the propaganda goal of aligning the Ukrainian
government with the U.S. in a manner that victimizes the Ukrainian people. Closing out his
interview, Glazyev discusses agreements between the EU and Ukraine, stating, “...we can never
accept [an agreement] as legitimate, particularly considering there is no legitimate Ukrainian
government to sign it” (Simes, 2014). This quote is essential for the purposes of this research.
Russian officials view the Ukrainian government as illegitimate, and want to portray this to the
world. If the government of Ukraine is illegitimate, Ukraine itself is illegitimate. The key
element of Putin’s propaganda regime regarding Ukraine is its attempts to erase Ukraine.
Glazyev echoes that here.
These three politicians articulate Russia’s official position regarding Ukraine. Putin
discusses the historic ties between the two nations, bringing traditional discourse about the
brotherly ties between Russia and Ukraine into a more contemporary context. In addition to this
perspective, Poklonskaya and her interview serve to argue the continuity of this unified position.
Glazyev furthers both Putins and traditional academics' argument that those forces within the
Ukrainian government are at fault for the military and political conflicts between the two nations.
This is the stance of the Russian political engline, yet perhaps there are those in Russia that do
not pay attention to politicians or their stances. Therefore it is necessary to examine other
broadly consumed forms of media for similar messages.
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Chapter 2
The “Ukrainian Question” in Popular Nonfiction
What role does literature play in espousing propagandist messages? Literature, as a
widely consumed art, presents an opportunity to draw in an audience to distribute an author's
message. “Every genre of art has its own name…Similarly, political ‘genres’ have their own
clear and distinct names” (Starikov 2015, 52). This chapter analyzes how political messages can
be found outside of strictly political media, centering on the role printed media plays in enforcing
a narrative of historical unification between Russia and Ukraine, and the damage straying from
this unified position inflicts on Ukraine. The analysis draws parallels between the discussion
posed by political figures like Putin and the messages relayed in these texts. This second chapter
focuses on nonfiction literary works that present Ukrainian history and nationalism through a
Russian lens. Following the research in the political realm, it is useful to investigate the
presentation of Ukrainian history and national identity through the eyes of Russian popular
non-fiction works, because they present Russian propaganda themes to a different audience, and
must present their arguments as fact. The validity of these facts and the authors' perspectives are
necessary to examine because their arguments aim to persuade their audience to absorb the
information they present as fact. Ukraina : Haos i Revolucia - Oruzhie Dollara (Ukraine: Chaos
and Revolution - The Dollar’s Weapon) is an important work to review in that it discusses
Western involvement in Ukraine, as if to argue that the failings of the Ukrainian government are
caused by the choice of affiliating with the West rather than its historical partner, Russia. An
analysis of Oborona Donbassa: Igor' Strelkov - Uzhas Banderovskoj Hunty (Igor Strelkov: The
Horror of the Facist Junta. Defense of the Donbass) provides a Russian perspectives on the
“seperatist” fighters in Eastern Ukraine. Finally Ukraina - Vechnaja Ruina: Gopak Na Krovi.
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(Ukraine: Eternal Ruin - Dance on Blood) by Lev Vershinin provides a 21st century Russian
look at the historical conditions of Ukraine as an independent state.. In examining these texts, I
hope to show how they further disseminate the narrative of Ukraine as a lost piece of Russia, and
a nation in the pocket of the United States.

Odin Narod: A Perspective of a Chaotic Ukraine and American Intervention
Nikolai Starikov’s 2014 Ukraine: Chaos and Revolution - The Dollar’s Weapon is on a
list of 38 Russian books banned by the Ukrainian government in 2015. Starikov’s personal
website, https://nstarikov.ru/states, “Nikolai Viktorovich is always ready to respond to criticism
in a substantive manner, using concrete facts” (Starikov, 2022), and acknowledges that
“Historians accuse [him] of a lack of historical education and a biased interpretation of historical
facts.”. On the author's personal website he acknowledges claims of biased writing, which is
important as it provides insight to the manner in which this work is analyzed. The focus of
Ukraine: Chaos and Revolution - The Dollar’s Weapon is to “debunk'' several elements of the
Maidan and the subsequent changes within the Ukrainian government, and to frame it in the
context of Western intervention.
To begin, the front and back cover of the book presents the perspective and themes of the
book. The front cover of the book itself, places an American dollar sign inside the “O” in
“Dollar”, as if to further emphasize American involvement with the Ukrainian government, and
“Weapon” is the only element of the title to be highlighted in red, effectively stressing both the
violence and urgency the this book aims to stir. The back cover outlines the author's argument
that a key American goal for the situation in Ukraine is to “create an absolutely anti-Russian
state,” near the Russian border, importantly adding that this Eastern Ukrainian region is one in

RUSSIA’S AGENDA FOR UKRAINE
33
which “everyone speaks Russian perfectly” (Starikov 2015, rear cover). It is important to note
that he emphasizes the speaking of Russian in Ukraine, as it is an element used to argue that
Ukrainian and Russian people are a unified people, and the goal set forth by Putin is to unify
these peoples once again.

Figure 2.1 “Cover of Ukraine: Chaos and Revolution - The Dollar’s Weapon”

Following this vein of proposed unity, the most critical phrase Starikov prints on the back
cover of the book, printed in bold lettering, is “Potomu, chto my odin narod” or “Because we are
one people” (Starikov 2015, rear cover). Similarly to the media examined in Chapter 1 of this
thesis, the arguments presented in just the binding of this book align with Putin’s goals for the
propaganda machine in Russia, which is to frame for the Russian audience that Russians and
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Ukrainians are one unified people, Odin Narod, a brotherhood separated from one another by a
Ukrainian government controlled by the U.S. and Western Ideology.
One theme this book hyper-focuses on is the idea that the West, specifically the U.S., is
the cause of Ukraine separating itself from its traditional Russian brotherhood. When discussing
the Euromaidan protests, Starikov writes, “All further steps of the ‘opposition’ [were] led from
the American embassy on one hand, and Ukrainian leadership on the other, [like] pawns in a
chess game” (Starikov 2015, 39). Here Starikov is arguing that the U.S. fueled the Maidan
protests in a form of power play against the then sitting Ukrainian government. More
interestingly, Starikov continues this idea by stating, “ [Ukraine] is a country…where ordinary
citizens, their life, and their health, are pawns” (Starikov 2015, 39). Starikov wants to frame the
U.S. as actinging within Ukrainian space for their own aims, giving little care to the people. He
creates an image of the Maidan protesters, backed by the West, as playing with fire at the
expense of their own countrymen. Later in this section the author discusses the subsequent
violence of the Maidan, specifically deaths during the movement. Starikov notes, “‘Unknown
snipers’ killed about three dozen people in the capital of Ukraine…Provocateurs from Western
special services killed the policemen, Maidan protesters, and bystanders in order to inflame
passions” (Starikov 2015, 49). While placing “unknown snipers” in quotations, Starikov is
making it clear to a reader that they are not unknown, that these violent killers were Western
special forces. He argues that while the Maidan protesters believed this was their government
senseless killing, it was foreign governments whose goals were to “inflame passions”. Starikov
wants to show that these protests were ignited by the West to cause chaos. If the West and the
U.S. are the problem, who presents a solution to Starikov? Russia.
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To show that Russia is a protector of the will of Ukrainian people, unlike the West,
Starikov discusses the Crimean referendum and its willful returning to Russia. Starikov claims
that he himself flew to Simferopol, a Crimean city, to observe the referendum. He presents a
picture of peace that juxtaposes the chaos of the Maidan. He notes that, “people smile affably,
they feel festive” (Starikov 2015, 82). Starikov makes the point of noting that at the polling
stations were buffets of “delicious pastries” (Starikov 2015, 82). Whether this be the case or not,
Starikov adds the additional, superfluous details to create a stark contrast between the Maidan
(anti-Russian) and the referendum (pro-Russian). He wants to paint Crimea as an example of just
peaceful procedure completely unlike his imagining of the Maidan as a coup d'etat.
Crimea “voting” to reunify with Russia is used as an example of what can and should be
done to “save” Ukraine. Starikov (2015),
Ukraine as a state was on the verge of death due to a state coup carried out by
pro-American forces in Kiev…And these tragic events have sharply exacerbated the
international contradictions in Ukrainian society that have existed all the years of its
independence” (83).
The author raises another element of the Russo-Ukrainian discourse, the continuity of issues
throughout Ukrainian independence. The modern day issue is the “pro-American” attitudes,
which alienate Ukraine from their traditional understandings of identity, or so it is claimed.
Starikov writes, “Western civilization, with all its gloss and brilliance, is alien” (Starikov 2015,
83). He justifies the Crimean annexation by arguing that not only was the change in government
after the Maidan an American “coup”, but that it reintegrated the Slavic family. He argues,
“Russian people are a part of Ukraine, and Ukraine is part of the Russian civilization…Craving
for Russia is craving for oneself” (Starikov 2015, 83).
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The conclusion “We can only win by uniting” (Starikov 2015, 239) discusses Russia’s
historical superpower status, arguing that it only became thus when “...in addition to the Russian
people, Turks and Caucasians, peoples from the North and South began to contribute to [the
U.S.S.R.’s] development” (Starikov 2015, 239). He compares this to the U.S. becoming a
“powerful state” when the 50 states merged together. This reference to merging together, and the
predecessor state to the Russian Federation, the U.S.S.R., only becoming powerful when
absorbing other peoples further emphasizes his goal in arguing for unity between Russia and
former U.S.S.R. states.
Starikov further argues that the U.S.S.R. defeated Hitler only because “we were
together”, referring to the peoples of the U.S.S.R. Starikov states, “If there were a bunch of
‘independent states’ instead of the U.S.S.R., their independence would have ended very sadly”
(Starikov 2015, 239). The idea that separate states would have failed without their affiliation
with the U.S.S.R. in a broader context parallels the ideas of Putin that Ukraine is a failing state
without Russia. Russian propaganda zeros in on the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government,
and its purported inability to properly protect and serve Russians and Russian-speaking people
throughout the country, and Starikov’s quote is viewed as a nod to Ukraine’s need for unity or
reunion with Russia
It is important to note that Starikov places independence in quotation marks, as if
diminishing the meaning of independence for the U.S.S.R. satellite states. He argues that they,
along with Russia, cannot and will not survive without one another. Without using the word
specifically, here he is stressing the need for reunification. This need for reunification of peoples,
and territory, is described in urgence when Starikov (2015) writes, “
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It is no coincidence that today we see how quickly people find each other in a
difficult situation of chaos and lawlessness of Russian civilization, how quickly
they are able to stand together to solve the problems of protecting their loved ones
from encroachments” (239).
It can be argued that Starikov is indirectly discussing the tensions between Russians and
Ukrainians along the Eastern border of Ukraine when writing, “a difficult situation of chaos and
lawlessness of Russian civilization,” thus equating Ukraine as part of Russian civilization as a
whole. He specifically states, “...because Ukraine is a part of the Russian civilization,”. These are
one people, one nation, and it is crucial that they reunite to rebuild their status as a superpower,
and avoid allowing Western nations like the U.S. to gain the upperhand in Russian matters. He
writes, “Our goals are clear - Greater Russia…Our geopolitical opponents understand this”
(Starikov 2015, 240). Starikov uses a form of “we” or “our” in discussing Russian and Ukrainian
people 10 times in just two pages. When discussing these peoples he describes, “We have a great
history and culture behind us,” and “We have great ancestors and great heroes behind us”.
Starikov concludes his book emphasizing key elements prescribed within Putin’s propaganda
agenda; The West and the U.S. are using Ukraine as a pawn to achieve their goals, historically
Ukrainian and Russian people are one, and they must unite together once more to rebuild their
strength.

Igor Strelkov and the Fight For Novorossiya
The second book analyzed in this study is 2014’s Igor Strelkov: The Horror of the Facist
Junta. Defense of Donbass by Mikhail Polikarpov. In the early 1990s Polikarpov, after
graduating from Moscow State University, traveled with a Russian volunteer detachment to fight
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for Serbia in the Bosnian War. The author is fascinated and versed in military conflict, and this
book reflects this. This book is a biography of Igor Strelkov, a Russian army veteran who helped
facilitate both the Annexation of Crimea as well as the militia groups in the Donetsk region of
Ukraine. This book glorifies Strelkov and his military conquests in the Donbas, while heavily
painting him as a heroic figure.

Figure 2.2 “Cover of Igor Strelkov: The Horror of the Facist Junta. Defense of Donbass''

The title of the book is telling of the author's understanding of the Ukrainian government
and its treatment of the Ukrainian people, and by extension, the Russian people. The word
“junta” refers to a group that controls a government, especially after a revolutionary seizure, and
is often associated with military dictatorships. In the current context, “junta” is used to refer to
the Ukrainian government that came into power following the Maidan protests. The use of
“fascist” adds to the title an even more negative connotation given that facist is a term most often
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associated with the Nazi regime in Germany, as within this context refers to the understanding
that those who reject Russian dominance in Ukraine.. The title alone argues Polikarpov’s points
in the book: The Ukrainian government is a fascist regime, which seized power during the
Maidan protests, and Russian freedom fighter Igor Strelkov became the defender of the Donbas.
It is important to understand how these authors frame the post-Maidan Ukrainian government.
Russian popular media uses this negative presentation to argue for the necessity of unity between
Russians and Ukrainians in order to protect their Ukrainian brothers and sisters.
Polikarpov describes the Russian military veteran-turned-freedom fighter as,
“...chivalrously noble, courageous, tough, but fair - the honor, intelligence, and conscience of the
Russian people” (Polikarpov 2014, rear cover). Polikarpov is idealizing Igor Strelkov, framing
him as the hero of the Donbas, and specifically emphasizes that these are Russian characteristics,
thus juxtaposing the unspoken belief of Polikarpov that these are characteristics not possessed by
the Ukrainian regime. More interestingly, Polikarpov discusses the border conflict as a conflict
within “Novorossiya”. Novorossiya historically refers to the regions of Ukraine north of the
Black Sea, a territory annexed by Catherine the Great in the late-18th century. This space is
considered as part of the Russian Imperial space. In this context, however, it means something
else. Here it refers to an idea of a modern day “New Russia” that encompasses the Donbas,
proposed by the leaders of the DPR and LPR. Polikarpov writes, “Novorossiya is in the fire of
war. Will this war become the starting point of Russia’s rebirth?” (Polikarpov 2014, rear cover).
The reference to the “rebirth” of Russia echoes ideas discussed in Ukraine: Chaos and
Revolution - The Dollar’s Weapon which describes the need for Russia to once again become a
superpower, and that in order to do so it must reunite with the lost regions of shared peoples; it
must regain parts of Ukraine, if not the country in whole.
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This work is predominantly filled with battle anecdotes, military movements,
engagements, and field observations. While an essential element of Polikarpov’s storytelling
methodology, what is under review is the manner in which he frames Strelkov in comparison to
military fighters. Polikarpov discusses who he views as the “heroes” within the story of the
Donbas, the people who arose with “bright and unusual images” (Polikarpov 2014, 255). He first
identifies Natalia Poklonskaya, a figure discussed in Chapter 1, as “the cutest and most
unyielding prosecutor to the bandits of Crimea” whose heroism is described in “songs and
anime” (Polikarpov 2014, 255). Poklonskaya received enormous amounts of local glorification
with her role in the Crimean Annexation, or colloquially “referendum”. Polikarpov’s goal in
writing this book is to bring about a similar reception of Strelkov. He writes of Strelkov as
“Calm, thoughtful, serious…and very polite” with the intention of promoting Strelkov as a
charming savior to his people. Polikarpov also paints Strelkov as an intelligent, research, and
extremely competent career military commander, one capable of securing the Donbas’ freedom
from a brutal Ukrainian government. The author interviews a childhood friend of Strelkov, and
quotes the friend, “Igor has been patriotic since childhood, passionate about military affairs, and
made himself a military man,” (Polikarpov 2014, 256). The first purpose in highlighting
Strelkov’s background in military affairs is to provide legitimacy and strength to Strelkov so he
may be shown as capable and dedicated. The other element to this quotation that must be
considered is the notion that Strelkov “has been patriotic since childhood”. Strelkov is an older
man, a child of the U.S.S.R. His patriotism in childhood is linked to a Soviet understanding of
the world, it is implied that his patriotism leans more towards a Russian idea of statehood rather
than a Ukrainian one.
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With this understanding, it becomes clear the manner in which Polikarpov uses Strelkov
as a foil to Ukrainian soldiers and commanders. They are described in this book as violent,
undisciplined, and incompetent. Polikarpov writes of the “Ukrainian punishers” attempts to
“destroy the popular uprising” (Polikarpov 2014, 259). The use of “punisher” creates an
aggressively violent image of the Ukrainian military, one the is in opposition to Strelkov’s own
approachability.
In interviewing Strelkov himself, Polikarpov raises questions regarding the abilities of the
Ukrainian military, to which Strelkov replies, “...the logic of the Ukrainian command is
completely unclear to me,” (Polikarpov 2014, 262). Strelkov, described as a career military
commander, well versed in battle, makes the point that to him the Ukrainian comamand is
incompetent. This point is not contested by Polikarpov in the interview, signaling his agreement
with this statement. The goal in this section is to place Strelkov not only as the hero, but the
superior intellect capable of withstanding the Ukrainian military. This all ties in with the
discussion of Ukraine within Russian circles as a failing state. If its military is unintelligible and
weak when compared to a small group of seperatist fighters, this bodes poorly for the state as a
whole.

A History of Failure: Ukraine in Eternal Ruin
Unlike Igor Strelkov: The Horror of the Facist Junta and Ukraine: Chaos and
Revolution, which centered on recent events, Lev Vershinin’s 2014 Ukraine - Eternal Ruin: A
Dance on Blood. The book focuses primarily in the early-20th century. Vershinin highlights a
history of lies and failures relating to Ukrainian nationalism. The back cover states, “In trying to
somehow hide the bitter truth about the eternal failure of their state, the Bandera people are
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replacing the real past with delusional myths” (Vershinin 2014, rear cover). It further states that
the book is an historical investigation that shows, “time after time the Ukrainian pseudo-elite led
its people to national catastrophe, chaos, anarchy, and ruin” (Vershinin 2014, rear cover). The
book's cover too serves as an indicator as to the author's perspective regarding the Ukrainian
state, showing a molotov cocktail, with a Ukrainian flag used as the incendiary device. This
symbolizes the violence Vershinin associates with the Ukrainian state, and its status as a burning
bomb waiting to explode.

Figure 2.3 “Cover of Ukraine - Eternal Ruin: A Dance on Blood”

Vershinin’s book, written as an historical overview of Ukraine starting in the 16th
century, contains several prominent themes that fit the mold of the established propaganda
agenda in domestic media. Firstly, Russia, whether it be Imperial Russia or Soviet Russia, is
painted as a source of safety or protection, a wise older brother. Vershinin discusses the 16th and
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17th century Cossack rebellions in the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, a territory stretching
into modern day Ukraine. He writes of rebels fleeing “in droves for the salvation of Russia,
settling, with Moscow’s permission, on the lands of the future Kharkiv region” (Vershinin 2014,
16). What is important here is not the fact itself, but rather the diction used by Vershinin. The use
of “salvation” sets Russia up early on as a hero in the story he paints of Ukraine. Additionally,
the insertion of “with Moscow’s permission” adds little to the historical contextualization of the
text; it is unnecessary, but emphasizes Russia’s authority, something seen throughout the book.
Flowing through several chapters, spanning and linking several decades, are three common
themes: historically there was a want and need for Ukrainian unity with Russia, there exist
inabilities within Ukrainian governments to honestly represent and correctly govern Ukraine, and
“Ukrainization” of the territory is consistently problematic and unwanted.
Vershinin, in describing historical events, goes out of his way to insert personally biased
notes. Vershinin begins to discuss the establishment of an independent Ukraine amidst the chaos
of the Russian Revolution (1917-1923) in Chapter 16. He centers on newly established Ukrainian
political bodies like that of the Central Rada, an early parliamentary body created to serve as a
representative of Ukrainian people, organizations, and interests. Vershinin quotes the First
Universal of the Central Rada, “Ukraine is not separated from the whole of Russia and does not
break with the Russian State, but ...Ukrainans will henceforth create their own lives” (Vershinin
2014, 201). The First Universal, published in 1917, was a document that aimed to establish
Ukrainian autonomy in governance. The Central Rada produced the First Universal amidst
Ukrainian frustration with the Russian Provisional Government, a government established
following the collapse of the Russian Imperial state. The inclusion of this quote specifically, out
of the entire Universal, is important. The Universal was an attempt by Ukraine’s newly forming
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government to forge independence, but through Vershinin’s quotation of this line, that does not
fully come across. Rather, Vershinin uses it to emphasize a “separate but equal” form of unity.
That Ukraine can exist as its own cultural space, “Ukrainians will henceforth create their own
lives”, but is still to remain within the Russian sphere, “Ukraine is not separated from the Whole
of Russia and does not break with the Russian state,”. Vershinin further emphasizes a historic
desire to remain tied to Russia in his insertion of another quote from the Second Universal of
Ukraine,
“We, the Central Rada, which has always stood for not separating Ukraine from Russia,
in order to...jointly go to the development and prosperity of the whole of Russia, ... we
accept with satisfaction the call of the Government for unity” (Vershinin 2014, 202).
It is the placement of this quote that is important to analyze. Vershinin inserts this in the midst of
discussing the factional and chaotic space of the Ukrainian Rada. Here he sets up Russia as a
figure that unifies the factions of Ukrainian politics, yet avoids going into detail regarding
possibilities of Russian pressure to do so, rather Ukraine is uniting because it believes doing so
will be best for the greater power, for Russia.
This emphasis on the need of Russia during the revolutionary period to remain tied to
Ukraine connects to another idea Vershinin emphasizes throughout the book, the inability of
Ukrainian governing bodies to properly serve and represent their people. The title, Ukraine:
Eternal Ruin, alludes to this idea. Throughout the chapters discussing the late-19th and
early-20th centuries in Ukraine, Vershinin presents the idea that the attempts to form
representative governments were false, failures, because they were not truly representative of the
people. The government he describes as illegitimate in this section of the book, the Ukrainian
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People's Republic (UPR), is the independent state established in the period of 1917 to 1920,
under the leadership of hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky with close ties to Germany and later Poland.
One specific example of this notion arises when discussing the Central Rada. Under the
subsection titled, “The Office Writes” Vershinin writes, “If earlier the Central Rada did not
represent anyone, now it did not represent anyone doubly…the “government” was purely
socialist, and no “class alien” was allowed there” (Vershinin 2014, 201). When discussing the
earlier Central Rada, Vershinin means to highlight its first establishment, filled with the local
intelligentsia he earlier describes as illegitimate due to the existence of no “real” elections. Here
he furthers that notion. While it can and should be recognized that the Central Rada of Ukraine in
1917 did not form from a fully democratic process, Vershinin does not fixate on the power
struggles and the popping up of governments within Russia at the time, he only focuses on the
chaos in Ukraine. The author wants to focus on the illegitimate nature of the Central Rada, going
so far as to put “government” in quotations.
This presentation of the earliest forms of independent government in Ukraine and not
representative of the people and illegitimate echoes the goals within propaganda narratives
espoused by the Russian government; themes of chaos, mismanagement, Western intervention,
and the severing of brotherly bonds. The Russian propaganda agenda wants to argue that the
current Ukrainian government itself is illegitimate, not of or for its people. If Vershinin presents
the beginnings of Ukrainian independent governance of non representative and illegitimate, what
does that mean in regards to its modern day successor? Moreover, Vershinin seems to present
these historical facts as indicators of what is to come in modern day Ukraine. He writes of the
failure of the UPR, and how “After the collapse of the UPR, many of its leaders and activists,
began to ask the Soviet authorities for forgiveness and permission to return” (Vershinin 2014,
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252). The collapse he discusses involved the conquering of the new Ukrainian state by the
Bolsheviks in 1920, though Vershinin does not elaborate on the military battles that led to such
conquering, rather he simply frames the collapse of the UPR as that, a failure of government.
The final important idea Vershinin plays upon throughout the book is the concept of
“Ukrainization''. The author understands “Ukrainization '' as an attempt to force a nationalist
agenda upon the people conforming to an idea of uniquely Ukrainian culture and norms, such as
the enforcement of the Ukrainian language and the acceptance of Ukraine as a national identity.
Under the Ukrainian Rada’s leadership, Vershinin discusses, the leadership within the UPR
argued “...first of all “Ukrainization '' was necessary in strengthening the new nation (Vershinin
2014, 199). Vershinin makes clear that this was very unpopular with “local aliens”, those who
did not identify as Ukrainian, in discussing only 107 people in Kyiv, despite the large population,
enrolled in Ukrainian language instruction and many villagers boycotted school that used “Little
Russian language of instruction” (Vershinin 2014, 199). The politicization of language, and the
focus Vershinin places on this, adheres to modern conflicts in Easter Ukraine. A key element
used by separatists in the Donbas region to justify their cause of separation is the forced usage of
the Ukrainian language in schools. Vershinin zeros in on language conflicts within Ukraine
further when discussing Hetman Skoropadsky’s government. He writes that some members of
the Ukrainian intelligentsia accused the Hetman of pro-Russian affiliations ``...on the grounds
that the Russian language was not eradicated” (Vershinin 2014, 216). It is important to remember
that the point of this analysis is not on Vershinin’s historical accuracy per se, but rather the
manner in which he presents historical events in the context of modern Ukraine.
Ukrainization, specifically in terms of enforcing the use of the Ukrainian language, is a
key element of the instability of the short lived UPR according to Vershinin. It is necessary to
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read Ukraine: Eternal Ruin, published in 2014, within the context of the Russian seizure of
Crimea and the rebellions in Eastern Ukraine. Similar to the discussions of Ukrainization,
Verhsinins fixation on the UPR’s failure, resulting from its relationship with Germany, can be
read alongside Putin’s message that the modern day Ukrainian government is failing its people,
too focused on pleasing another Western state (the United States). This meaning, like the
Bolsheviks in 1920, Russia steps in to protect the people and reestablish a sense of order. The
role of this text as a source of propaganda lies not necessarily in the historical events discussed,
but rather the authors framing of such events and the timing of the book’s publication.
Summarily, Vershinin discusses throughout the book the failures of the Ukrainian governments
in periods of independence. In all such cases, he blames affiliations with states or powers other
than Russia as well as the attempts to nationalize and Ukrainize the region. Vershinin presents
Ukraine’s history as one of failure, one that will fail again without Russia.
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Chapter 3
From the Minds of Directors to the Eyes of Viewers:
Russia’s Cinematic Portrayal of Ukraine and Its History
This chapter conducts an investigation into Russian film to analyze the presence of
similar narratives to those discussed previously, and to judge the effectiveness of these films in
promoting such narratives. Just how are Ukrainians, Ukrainian history and current socio-political
issues presented to the Russian public on the silver screen? Upon watching popular films, one
can ask, what did this film make an audience feel? For the purposes of this chapter three films
were selected due to their connection to Russian-Ukrainian relations. Andres Puutstumsa,
Alexander Samokhvalov, and Boris Rostov’s My iz budushchego 2, We are From the Future II
(2010), is a science-fiction film that follows Russian characters who travel back in time to an
active World War II battlefield in Ukraine and find themselves in conflict with Ukrainian
nationalists. Though this film falls outside of the thesis’ main period of study, it provides an early
example of Russian filmmakers stereotyping and vilification of Ukrainians, and after examining
this, later films will show how these ideas are further developed. Opolchenochka, Rebel Girl
(2019), directed by Aleksei Kozlov, follows the story of a young woman in the Donbas who joins
a militia in order to protect herself and her community from the violence surrounding the region.
Finally, Solntsepёk, or Sunburn (2021), directed by Maxim Brius, also takes place in the Donbas
amidst the ongoing war. Sunburn (2021) sees an ex-soldier, hardened from war in Afghanistan,
faced with a moral crisis of taking up arms once again but this time to defend his own
community. Although fictional, these films were based on the official line about the Donbas
conflict coming from the Russian government and which circulated in Russian mass media.
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Science Fiction and Stereotyping: We Are From the Future II (2010)
Puutstumsa’s We Are From the Future II begins with black and white historic battle
footage from World War II, with a voice over discussing the summer of 1944 which saw Soviet
troops push Axis powers toward their western borders. The narrator makes direct reference to the
14th SS-Volunteer Division "Galicia", a German military division composed predominantly of
Ukrainian volunteers (Puutstumsa, 2010). While this is historically accurate, this direct and early
reference to the composition of this division as Ukrainians serves an important role for the
filmmaker, and his goals. It immediately sets up for the audiences who overall are the
antagonists, or the “villains”, of the film. Not the Germans, nor the Axis powers as a whole, but
rather the Ukrainians specifically. Moreover, the images of artillery fire and the dark film created
a gruesome and violent tone. Here, Puutstumsa is foreshadowing both the issues the film's
protagonists will run into with the Ukrainian nationalists as well as the violence the protagonists
will endure.

Figure 3.1 “Screencap from We Are From the Future II (2010) showing the Ukrainian Nationalist”
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This film is a sequel to 2008’s We Are From the Future, wherein four young men
accidentally travel back in time to WWII while digging at an historic cite for Nazi memorablia.
The first film in this series centers more so on themes of adventure, and general war film
imagery. We Are From the Future II (2010) follows two of these young historians who once
again travel to the past, yet this time it is to Ukraine while participating in a reenactment of the
Lvov-Sandomierz operation of July 1944 (Puutstumsa, 2010). When arriving at the encampment,
the historians come into contact with a group of Ukrainian nationalists. These Ukrainians are
shown to be wearing dark colors that juxtapose the bright apparel worn by the Russian historians.
They are seen partying, drinking, listening to heavy rock music, and carrying themselves in an
aggressive manner. Not only does this present them as a future source of conflict for the main
protagonists, but it portrays Ukrainian characters to the audience as dark and unlikeable. A
Ukrainian man, Taras, is seen smoking and toting a gun while harassing a Russian woman Maria,
interrupted by protagonist Oleg who comes to Maria’s rescue. Here, the Ukrainian young men
are portrayed as predatory and disrespectful, but Maria is “saved” from the brutes by the good
Russian character. As a result of Oleg’s interjection, a fight breaks out between Oleg and Taras,
highlighting an aggressive portrayal of the Ukrainian nationalists.
Through a bomb detonation during the reenactment, Oleg, Taras, and their friends are
transported back to 1944, to the active warzone. The four awaken in the custody of the Ukrainian
volunteers working alongside Germany on the front against the Soviets. In one scene, the
Ukrainian volunteer soldiers question Taras and Seryy over their allegiances. Upon refusing a
drink from the questioning official, Seryy is immediately accused of not being Ukrainian after
all. It could be argued that this subtle plot point portrays Ukrainians as alcoholics in that Seryy’s
mere refusal of a drink would diminish his “Ukrainian-ness”. Later, the four men are escorted by
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the Ukrainian volunteer soldiers to a pit containing soldiers and civilians alike, and the four
heroes witness the Ukrainian soldiers brutally execute these prisoners. While the film does take
place in wartime, and the execution of enemy soldiers in the pit can be contextualized to some
degree, it is the brutal execution of the ederly, the women, and the children in the pit that are
important to consider. Here, the director uses this scene to highlight the brutality and cruelness of
these Ukrainian soldiers.
Later, the four men manage to escape the custody of the Ukrainian soldiers only to find
themselves thus in custody of the Soviets. The Soviet camp is portrayed in complete contrast
with the Ukrainian camp. Whereas the Ukrainian troops were dirty, crude, and conventionally
unattractive, the Soviet soldiers were clean, put together, proper, and more conventionally
attractive. The director purposefully juxtaposes these soldiers in order to further the image of the
Ukrainians as brutes and wildmen for the audience, reflecting the film's earlier images of Taras
and his nationalist gang.
Over the course of the film the four men from the future engage in the trials and violence
of actual war, and are once again returned to the future during an explosion. The film ends in a
montage of the heroes returning to normal, readjusting to their lives in the future. Interestingly
the characters form close bonds, ones that oppose their shared hatred at the beginning of the film.
They are forced to work together for survival, and in uniting they succeed in their goal of
returning to the future unscathed. Moreover, once they return to the future they are shown
regarding one another as brothers instead of with animosity, confirming a vision of Ukrainians
and Russians as brotherly people. While the film has a joyful ending, seeing the characters
survive and find love, the stereotypes of Ukrainian peoples and their history are neither subtle
nor easily forgotten. Taras and Seryy were initially depicted in the film as troublemakers,
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aggressive and disrespectful young men, as were the other Ukrainian nationalist youths Oleg and
Borman encountered when first arriving at the reenactment. Taras and Seryy only redeemed
themselves in the eyes of the audience over the drawn out battles and hardships the pair were
forced to encounter in the past. It leaves the audience with the idea that it was only this
traumatic, and unrealistic, trip to the past that redeemed their characters. Otherwise, they would
remain equated as “enemy” type characters like the rest of the Ukrainian nationalist youths.
Moreover, the characters become brothers-in-arms after surviving the past and its horrors
together, fitting within the discourse of the slavic ‘brotherhood’ discussed in the literature review
and reinforced by Putin. There existed a visually stark difference between the Soviet and
Ukrainian volunteer soldiers the heroes of the film encountered, and this feels purposeful. The
film's plotlines of adventure, action, and romance win over the audience, yet it is undeniable that
the imagery that is left in the mind of a viewer regarding Ukrainian people at the films end.
Though produced in 2010, outside of the main chronology of this thesis, this film serves
as a preliminary example of Russia’s framing of Ukraine. We are From the Future II (2010)
contains stereotyping of Ukrainians that only grows within Russian filmmaking in the
subsequent years. The film’s depictions of Ukrainian nationalists, and their path to salvation
coming through the union with Russian men serves as an example of this discussion's
employment prior to the events of 2014 and onward.

The Hardening of an Unexpected Hero: Rebel Girl (2019)
Similarly to the film previously discussed, Aleksei Kozlov’s Rebel Girl (2019) also takes
place in the midst of armed conflict, though the setting of this film is much more recent.
Interestingly, Rebel Girl (2019) was filmed and produced in the Donbas region of Ukraine. The
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2021 film is set in 2014, during the outbreak of violence and tension between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine. The film's tone is set early on, with the first few moments containing a
montage of battle scenes, topographical maps, and images of political meetings. In one example,
a protest in the Donbas is shown, in another there is presented an image of President Obama
meeting with Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko. The voice over discusses thousands of
people who discovered a “bitterness” for their situation, who “leave their native villages' ' to join
New Russia. This film is immediately established not only as a war film, but a highly politicized
film. These opening moments align themselves with the attitudes established by the Russian
politicians examined in the first chapter of this research; the film shows that the people of
Ukraine are under a violent regime, in the pocket of Western leaders. These people set out to
unify themselves with Russia in order to become part of a New Russia. The heroes of this story,
the people who dare reject the status quo and take up arms, are the militia men from the Donbas.
The following scene contains an emotional moment between the film’s main character,
yet to be named, and his mother. He discusses his need to leave for Crimea, to avoid the war, to
which she sobs and hugs him close, praying to God for his safety. She begs him not to take up
arms and join the war. Firstly, the scene is darkly lit with gray undertones, and somber piano
notes play in the background, marking this scene as crucial. More importantly, it is interesting to
note that in order to flee the violence of the ongoing military conflict in their region, the man
seeks relocation to Crimea, not a larger city in Ukraine like Kyiv. The film is set in the summer
of 2014, already after Russian troops occupied and annexed Crimea. The dramatic goodbye sees
the mother pray, bemoaning the casualties of this war of “fascism”, which strictly aligns with
President Putin’s argument that the Ukrainian government was a fascist regime.
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In another scene, the man traveling to Crimea is shown in a car with a companion, with
whom he discusses that “...a normal man shouldn’t run like a hare to bow to the occupiers…he
should defend his home with a weapon in hand”. If it is at all unclear to the audience who these
“occupiers” are, images are shown of these men being subject to artillery fire, launched by men
in Ukrainian military garb. The Ukrainian military, and by extension government, are the
occupiers of this film, the villains.
The audience is made to feel sympathy for reporter Katya and her love interest Ataman,
as scenes of their growing relationship are montaged with romantic music and a hazy lighting
effect. This does not distract, however, from the politicized messaging not so subtly displayed in
the background of the scenes. Katya, a female reporter, helps the militia man film his
anti-government interviews, with rebel militia flags in the background of the scenes, and their
mutual adorning of rebel militia garb. In another moment, the couple travel to an Orthodox
church to discuss their desire to be wed, and despite the audience knowing that the two are
Ukrainian, the priest refers to Katya as a “Russian Princess”, describing that during hard times in
Ancient Russia, people would call upon the Princess to stand at the front of the people’s army.
Katya presents a fusion of Ukrainian national identity, given her Ukrainian citizenship, and one
of a broader Russian-world identity. She is the key unifying figure between the two worlds. This
discussion is used by the director as a sort of foreshadowing for the leadership role Katya will
later take in the film. But from a political perspective, this moment further establishes the idea
that these characters view themselves as more Russian than Ukrainian. Ataman in this scene also
questions the priest on the Church’s understanding of the war, noting that the priests and leaders
in Kyiv bow to the “fascist government”, once again framing the Ukrainian government as the
villain as well as the members of the Orthodox faith who support it.
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Figure 3.2 “Screencap from Rebel Girl (2019) showing Katya’s transition”

The military tones of this film are inescapable, creating a sense that the war itself is too
deeply ingrained in the lives of these people from the Donbass. Ataman and Katya are to be wed,
yet in route to the wedding the groom's truck is hit by an RPG fired by Ukrainian troops. Filmed
at dusk, the militiamen of Ataman discover the wreck, and the darkness of the wreckage is in
stark contrast with the brightness of the wedding venue and Katya’s wedding dress. It creates a
sense of tragedy, one that can only be blamed upon those actors who took away Katya’s groom
too soon. As a result of this heartbreak, we see Katya’s character transition into a hardened
militant herself. She breaks down, shaving her bright blonde hair, appearing now with a powerful
air and takes an active role in the actions of the rebel army in order to both fight for freedom and
avenge the brutal death of her fiance at the hands of the Ukrainian military. The film cuts to
Katya and a fellow soldier cleaning and preparing their tank, later the two successfully destroy a
Ukrainian checkpoint. Katya and her partner are welcomed back at the rebel outpost, playfully
engaging with the journalist and posing for photos. The Katya that detonated the outpost
drastically opposes the first visions of the character seen in the beginning of the film.
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Rebel Girl, aside from its main plotline that follows Katya, presents the Lugansk region
as an extension of Russia. In one scene the characters attend a play set during the Cossack
Hetmanate, with actors referencing the “knights of the Russian land”. This circles back to
discussions of which nation can historically claim the lands in modern Ukraine. These
characters, and this film, align with an idea of Russian historic continuity in this region of
Ukraine. The play about Cossack knights fighting for their “Russian land” serves the film as a
parallel to the fighters in the film struggling for their land from the Ukrainian government.
Furthermore the film ties into ideas presented in the literature from Chapter 2 in that on several
occasions characters refer to the Maidan as a “coup”. In another scene, the film also emphasizes
the brutality of Ukrainian nationalists. A heavy-set, tattooed, violent nationlist and his faction
raid a village in Eastern Ukraine, beheading a young man and strangling another in a church.
This over violence corresponds with a failure of the Ukrainian state to protect its people, tying
into ideas created in the works discussed in Chapter 2.

Solntsepek and the Overt Brutality of Conflict
Created in a similar structure as Rebel Girl (2019), Sunburn (2021) by Maxim Brius
chooses to follow the chaos within the violent Donbas region. The film contains a violent and
dramatized perspective on the results of the Maidan protests and subsequent seperatist movement
in the Luhansk region. The blockbuster film follows Vlad, an ambulance driver in Luhansk, who
witnesses the shelling of his city and the damage that ensues. The 2021 film’s trailer alone has
been viewed 8 million times, indicating the film’s ability as a source to reach a broader audience.
Sunburn (2021) reveals its politics and goals within the opening credits of the film, in a manner
similar to Rebel Girl (2019) and We Are from the Future II (2010), with the use of a narrator’s
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introduction. The Maidan and subsequent change in governance in Ukraine in 2014 are referred
to as a “Coup d'Etat”, with the people of the Donbas described as subjected to a violent
“regime”, a regime that began a “mass extermination” of civilians in the Donbas. The narrorator
states that Ukrainian troops began carrying out, “widespread genocide of the Russian-speaking
population,” as if to say the focus of the military was to wipe out the Russians in Ukraine. This
description of the change in government argues the invalidity of the Ukrainian government, and
contains language that allows the conflict within Ukraine to be equated with the violence of the
Nazi regime in Germany, of which the film contains more examples. These messages and tones
echo that of other sources examined in this research. The idea being broadcast again here is that
the Ukrainian government is a fascist regime, cruel to its citizens, targeting Russians in Ukraine,
and that unity and alliance with Russia is essential.
Sunburn (2021) relies heavily on its shock value, with an incredibly violent, gory tone set
early on. Within the first 10 minutes of the film, a group of disorderly, drunk, and violent
delinquents wreak havoc upon a small community in Luhansk. The mauraders break into homes,
brutally murder a young father, with graphic visuals of blood and a look of cruelty on the
murderer’s face. The group then stabs and rapes a young mother in front of her child, kills the
child, and loots the home. This continues throughout the village, and in this scene immediately
presents the film’s perspective on the violence and chaos that ensued in Luhansk. This gore also
focuses on the innocence of the people themselves. These marauders serve the film as a reminder
of the Ukrainian abandonment of Lughansk. They are able to carry out this string of crime and
violence without consequence, because there is no one there to enforce the law. This grotesque
scene of violence evokes disgust and horror in a viewer, its shock value drawing an audience
member in, allowing them to be receptive to the arguments of the film.
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The audience meets the hero of the film in this scene, an ex-soldier who fought in
Afghanistan with the Soviet army named Vlad who with his family is attempting to flee to
Russia for safety. It is important to note that Russia, in being their destination, is established as a
“good guy” in contrast to the Ukrainian regime that allowed this brutality to occur. There is no
indication that Vlad himself is Russian, thus his desire to seek Russia for solace is an important
message portrayed to the audience. That Russia is the protector of Russian speaking people
throughout Ukraine. He is visually set up as a hero, rescuing and taking in a young girl from the
village. When escaping the village, he is intercepted by a group of men in Luhansk who have
formed a militia to protect their home and their people. The men, despite being war hardened and
stoic, are warm. They are shown as just and kind, assisting Vlad and his family. The commander
of the militia takes the family to stay with his own, and the scenes in this household provide the
majority of peaceful moments in the film. It is here in the commander's family home that the
audience is presented another example of the Ukrainian military being compared to the Nazi
regime. A young village girl is seen giving her great-grandfather’s cross pendant to one of the
militia men, saying it protected him when he was in Berlin. This is a symbolic moment for the
film with it referencing the Battle of Berlin, which saw the Red Army overthow the Nazi regime
in the city. They liberated the people of Germany from cruelty and despair, and it states to the
audience that this group of militiamen, favorable to and aided by Russia, will overthrow the
violent and corrupt regime in Ukraine. This heroism and bravery is then contrasted with Alexei,
a new character introduced to the audience. Alexei is an older veteran as well, living in Kyiv. He
is seen in a bar in Kyiv, and he overhears two young Ukrainians discussing the prospects of
European integration in Ukraine, and as the protagonist leaves the bar, he encounters Maidan
protesters. All appear young, drunk, and disorderly. Alexei is seen to be visibly annoyed by their
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behavior. This scene paints the young Ukrainans, and by extension the Maidan protesters as a
whole, in a poor light. They create an image of stupidity, that the Maidan itself was conducted by
young fools who do not understand the world.

Figure 3.3 “Screencap from Sunburn (2021) showing a violently beaten youth”

Sunburn (2021) follows Alexei as he enlists with the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalion in
Luhansk. The young men who arrive with him to the battalion are rambunctious, laughable, and
do not understand the depth of the violence occurring. They arrive at the battalion and the
audience is immediately horrified with the intimate brutality of the Ukrainian military. The
commander of the battalion greets the bus of volunteers, and the film shows two young men
captured by the Ukrainian’s in Luhansk. They are both disturbingly mutilated. One young man is
shown with sliced achilles tendons, forced to chop wood by the commander, and berated in front
of the volunteers for working slowly. Another captee is horrendously beaten, covered in blood,
terrified, and locked in a small wooden box like an animal. When seeing the look of disgust on
Alexei’s face, the Ukrainian commander simply yells, “This is war”. The film clearly portrays
the Ukrainian military as cruel, evil, with this tendency to violence further solidified when
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showing a soldier urinating on the beaten boy locked in the box. The film also echoes the
argument created in other sources that the Ukrainian government is in the hands of the West,
specifically the United States. In a cut scene of the Ukrainian volunteers training, in the
background can be heard an English speaker with a distinctly American accent stating, “We’ll
whip them into shape in no time”. The violent Ukrainian militia, portrayed as brutalizing their
own people, are in direct cahoots with the Americans.
If the Ukrainian government is supported by the evil Americans in this film, direct
connections are shown between the freedom fighters and Russia. When Vlad encounters the
militia's base of operation, Russian flags fly in front. While the brutal Ukrainian military is
supported by the Americans, the heroic militia of Luhansk that formed to save its people are
supported by Russia. In another scene of violence in the film, the militia commander is seen
walking towards the Lugansk regional administrative building, only for it to be shelled and
bombarded. Women pushing strollers are blown to pieces, buildings are destroyed, corpses and
severed limbs scatter the ground. In the chaotic aftermath, there is a Russian flag burnt and
tethered, yet still flying. For the purposes of the film, this symbolizes an attack on Russia, and
Russian people. This not only emphasizes to the audience that Luhansk’s residents, and by
extension Ukraine, are Russian, but that the attacks on these people are attacks on Russia. This
allows the film to validate and support Russia’s political argument that these are one people, and
the Ukrainian government is to blame.
This theme, the overt brutality and severance of the Ukrainian military and government,
courses throughout the film alongside another key theme. Ideas of uniting to support a common
goal are prevalent throughout the film. Vlad, the protagonist of the film, when taken in by the
militia could have chosen to isolate himself and his family to wait for the border with Russia to
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reopen. He chooses, however, to band with the militia and aid in their cause by driving the
ambulance from site of violence to site of violence. Vlad, the war veteran who wants to avoid
violence, chooses to go from one scene of violence to another in order to help the militiamen. In
another scene, following a bombing of a school the the murdering of school children, the
commander of the militiamen is returning to base and encounters the school’s choir teacher and a
teenager. He is an older, soft spoken, and large man. He requests to join the militia, yet the
commander refuses. Upon this response the choir teacher states, “Do you really think you have
the right to decide who can defend their land and who cannot?” The people, regardless of their
ability, are shown wanting to unite together to fight their common enemy and protect their
homeland. This is in alliance with the messages of unity discussed throughout this research. This
moment is set to be inspirational. The film, aided by its overt violence as a story telling method,
is convincing. It argues that these people in Luhansk, aided by Russia, must unite to fight the
fascist common enemy of the greater people, Ukraine.
The three films analyzed in this Chapter work together to create an incredibly negative
and violent presentation of the Ukrainian military. We are From the Future II (2010) brings in an
historical element. By placing the story in the WWII period, Puustusmaa argues that Ukrainian
military units and nationalists were violent from the beginnings of Ukrainian statehood. Rebel
Girl (2019) and Sunburn (2021) carry this violent imagery to a more contemporary context,
building upon the ideas established by Puustumaa. The three films, in one way or another,
enforce themes of success with unity. The characters in the films in one way or another forge
bonds with Russian characters or states to reestablish a lost sense of order.
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Conclusion
This thesis researches the manner in which the Russian discourse regarding the
legitimacy of independent Ukrainian statehood bleeds into Russian domestic propaganda. The
research aimed to discover how Russian popular media serves as an engine for political
propaganda to be dispersed to the Russian public. There exists a vast field of research related to
the intersection of Ukrainian statehood and Russian identity, with Mark von Hagen paving the
way for academic analysis of the ‘family’ relationship Russia imagines between itself and
Ukraine. This project explores the way in which Russian popular media serves as an engine for
political propaganda under Putin’s government, while also examining what messages are relayed.
In order to do so, I reviewed literature related to historic notions of Russian statehood and
identity, and found several principles that the Russian intelligentsia relies upon. Firstly, Russian
identity is firmly tied to an idea of a slavic “family” existing between Russia and Ukraine, with
Russia serving the trifecta as an “older” brother and Ukraine as the “little” or “littlest” brother.
Ukraine, as the “little” brother, needs the guidance and dominance of Russia in order to thrive.
Without Russia, in this discourse, Ukraine fails. The literature reviewed also discussed the
manner in which Russia regards Ukrainian rejections to this dominance. Any form of opposition
is understood as a rejection of this familial dynamic, a rejection influenced by Western powers,
led by fascists and extremists. To see if this discourse bleeds into Russian popular media, three
types of sources were selected for review that constituted a diverse range of media in order to
cover as much ground as possible. Speeches by popular politicians, nonfiction books, and films
served as the data for this study. The speeches, books, and films, excluding We Are From the
Future II (2010), were selected first for their creation within the period of Putin as Prime
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Minister and later President of Russia, and secondly for their relation to the current conflict
between Russia and Ukraine.
I organized my thesis in such a way to show how the current Russian political regime
came to understand their relationship with Ukraine. Putin is a student of history, and on many
occasions discusses this. His interest and love of Russian history is seen in his speech “On the
Historical Relationship between Russia and Ukraine” wherein he raises points of Russia and
Ukraine both finding origins in the Kyivan Rus’ and Cossack Hetmanate proto-states, ideas
discussed by von Hagen in his field defining work. Once it is understood that Putin adheres with
this notion of Russian identity, he begins to rework the idea of the familial nature between the
Russian and Ukrainian states. Rather than support previously explored ideas of Ukraine as the
‘little’ brother in need of Russia’s guidance for survival, he takes it a step further. Putin’s
arguments in his 2014 speech present a new discourse, that of Ukraine as the wayward brother
that rejected the family, in doing so allowing fascist extremists to overrun the country and turn
the Ukrainian people away from Russia. With this understood, the roles Poklonskaya and
Glazyev play in this discourse become clearer. Poklonskaya serves this narrative as a glorious
defector, a slavic woman rejecting the modern trajectory of Ukraine in favor of ‘returning’ to
Russia. She is loved and glorified because of this. As explored later in Chapter 1, Glazyev
supports a notion of Ukrainian illegitimacy, a state controlled by fascists on the American
payroll.
Following the review of the politicians, the thesis moves on to analyze three texts,
Ukraine: Chaos and Revolution - The Dollar’s Weapon by Nikolay Starikov, Igor Strelkov: The
Horror of the Facist Junta. Defense of Donbass by Mikhail Polikarpov, and Ukraine: Eternal
Ruin by Lev Vershinin. What is found is that these texts reinforce the ideas explored in the
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literature review, especially within Vershinin’s review of failed Ukrainian attempts at
independence. These books also advance the messages of Russian politicians, that during and
following the Euromaidan protests, and subsequent change of government, Ukraine betrayed
Russia and became subjects of the West, needing rebels like Igor Strelkov and others in the
Donbas region to fight against the new fascist order to free themselves from oppression and
rejoin that slavic family with Russia. Finally, the films Sunburn (2021) by Maxim Brius, Rebel
Girl (2019) by Aleksei Kozlov, and We are From the Future II (2010) by Andres Puutstumsa
serve as visual propaganda to visually promote imagery that the Ukrainian government,
Ukrainian nationalists, and the Ukrainian military are viscously violent and against the people.
These films are gory, grotesque in their violence, and depict on occasion the “wayward” brother
image of Ukraine.
The study in this thesis shows that Russian propaganda thoroughly depicts Ukraine as the
“wayward” territory threatening Russia’s position as a stately power, and easily articulates this
complicated discourse to the masses. But more research must be done. This is a relatively new
field of study, and academics should continue questioning Russia’s long term goals regarding
Ukraine, especially when considering Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This is not
new, conflict between Russia and Ukraine began in 2014, and some may argue earlier. This
thesis adds to existing literature in that it is one of the first to analyze howRussian popular media
serves as a propaganda arm to bring this discourse into the mainstream public. The thesis
examines just three political figures, just three books, and just three films. There is much still to
learn and understand about this issue. In order to better anticipate the future, more work is
required. This brings me to an interesting quote that can be found in Mark von Hagens 1995
work. He writes, “Clearly, then, Ukraine will have a history…But what sort of history should
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that be? And what sorts of history stand reasonably good chances of emerging triumphant in the
near future?" (von Hagen 1995, 664). This we must continue researching and following.
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